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Abstract We report on a novel approach to (semi-)automatically compile and verify contract-
regulated service compositions implemented as multi-agent systems. We model web service
behaviours and the contracts governing them as WSBPEL specification. We use the for-
malism of temporal-epistemic logic, suitably extended to deal with compliance/violations
of contracts, to specify properties of service compositions. We compile the WSBPEL be-
haviours into a specialised system description language ISPL, to be used with the model
checker MCMAS to verify the behaviours automatically. We illustrate these concepts us-
ing a motivating example whose state space is approximately 106 and discuss experimental
results.
Keywords Multi-agent systems ·Web services ·Model checking
1 Introduction
Web services (WS) are now considered one of the key technologies for building new gener-
ations of digital business systems. While a system made of few and localised services may
only interact in a small number of ways, when several subsystems are able to coordinate
in an open environment the end result may be much less predictable. Certain components
may fail, others may be incapacitated to provide the services in the expected timeline and
others still may have to adopt a policy of prioritisation among the requests that are being
received. Services participating in such compositions therefore need the autonomy to act
rationally and maximise their own design objectives while keeping the goals of the com-
position in perspective [1]. The paradigm of multi-agent systems (MAS) provides a useful
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2framework for reasoning about services and their compositions. Indeed the W3C consortium
[2] suggested that “A web service is an abstract notion that must be implemented by a con-
crete agent. The agent is the concrete piece of software or hardware that sends and receives
messages.”
When services are combined, a significant challenge is to regulate the business interac-
tions between them. While the designer of the system as a whole cannot guarantee an ideal
outcome for the service composition — since he or she has no overall control over it — he
may still wish to establish verifiable mechanisms to create an incentive in the agents to carry
out transactions in a way that is more likely to create an overall positive outcome. One such
mechanism is service level agreements (SLAs). SLAs are rules representing agreed level of
service provision to be supplied by the agents when interactions are invoked within certain
parameters. For example, a certain SLA may prescribe that all requests from a client are to
be answered within 1 sec whenever they are requested from 9am to 5pm and within 3 secs
from 5pm to 9am. While monitoring and identifying responsibilities in the violation of SLAs
is a non-trivial problem whenever service inter-dependencies exist, it is well recognised that
SLAs can act as a basic regulatory mechanism and may help engineers in predicting the av-
erage behaviour of the system. There certainly is an increasing emphasis on reasoning about
SLAs in software engineering and in the implementation of platforms supporting them [3,
4].
Although SLAs are useful, they can represent only basic agreements of service pro-
vision. But applications running complex, human-like activities require more general and
sophisticated declarative specifications certifying legal-like agreements among the parties.
These mechanisms should not only describe the intended timeline for the provision of ser-
vices but would also have to specify obligations, permissions of states and/or actions in a
variety of functioning circumstances including those coming into force as a result of certain
agents not performing “as expected”. A useful concept from the legal domain in this sense
is the one of contract as found in human societies. In an environment where previously un-
known services are dynamically discovered and bound, their composition may usefully be
underpinned by binding agreements or “contracts”. Should a contract be broken by one of
the parties, legal remedies may be applicable in the form of penalties, additional rights to
some party, and, possibly, additional penalties with respect to third parties. A key charac-
teristic of contracts is that they may still be broken. In this setting system engineers may be
interested in investigating what behaviours the MAS implements when all agents are ful-
filling their contracts, but also, and perhaps more importantly, what properties the system
exhibits when some of the agents are violating their contracts in certain ways. Particularly,
one may want to check if some really unwanted behaviours may result following certain vi-
olations or whether the system provides certain elements of resilience irrespective of agents
breaking their contracts. Verification of WS is an active topic of research (e.g., see [5,6]).
So far efforts have focused on checking safety and liveness properties only. However when
WS are phrased as a contract-regulated MAS there are other properties that seem worth
studying, such as various notions of correctness/violations of the contracts during a run, the
evolution of the agents’ knowledge about themselves, the contracts and the expected peers’
behaviours, etc. Indeed, there is a long and successful tradition in the MAS community to
use rich logic-based languages to specify the behaviour of agents in the system. In particular,
not only is temporal logic used but also, among others, epistemic (to reason about knowl-
edge of the processes), deontic (to reason about obligation of the processes), cooperation
(to reason about strategies of the agents), and other modalities. Recent developments in the
verification of MAS via model checking techniques [7–9] permit the verification of not only
3plain temporal languages but also a variety of modalities describing the informational states,
typically knowledge, of the agents.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach towards the verification of agent based ser-
vices, where transactions are regulated by binding electronic contracts. In our approach, all
possible behaviours of agent based services or “contract parties” (CP) are specified using
WSBPEL (BPEL for short) [10]. The contractually correct behaviours for every agent are
also specified in BPEL. A compiler is implemented that takes as input both these behaviour
descriptions, and generates a model in multi-agent systems as an ISPL program, which is
fed to the symbolic model checker MCMAS. By querying MCMAS, we can then verify
whether or not contracts may be broken by the agents implementing Web services, and if so,
what are the consequences of this.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the trace-based
semantics of interpreted systems as the underlying semantics for MAS. In Section 3 we
discuss various notions of compliance and violations with respect to contracts. Section 4
presents our proposed verification framework and a brief introduction to BPEL, MCMAS,
and ISPL. Section 5 discusses the implementation of the compiler, the key component in the
framework, which translates BPEL specifications into ISPL models. Section 6 introduces
a motivating example with some typical obligations and violations of contract parties, and
presents experimental results of our approach on that example. We conclude in Section 7,
where we also discuss related work. The paper extends the results originally presented in [11,
12].
2 Temporal deontic interpreted systems
We introduce here a formalism to express notions pertaining to the temporal evolution of
MAS, the knowledge of agents in the system as well as the correctness and violations of
states and runs with respect to a predetermined set of contracts regulating the interaction
among the agents.
2.1 Semantics
We model a MAS as composed of a set of agents and an environment. We assume that each
agent is implementing a contract-regulated web service providing particular functionalities.
We follow the interpreted system model [13] and assume that at any given time each agent
in the system is in a particular local state. This local state can be a state of compliance
with respect to the agent’s contracts or of violation. Following [14], we will call the former
allowed (or green) state, and disallowed (or red) the latter. This is a coarse distinction that
can be refined (see [14]), but it suffices for the scope of this paper.
Each agent has a repertoire of actions available; the action selection mechanism is given
by the notion of local protocol, effectively a function giving the set of possible actions that
may be performed when in a given local state. The system evolves by means of transitions
from a collection of (instantaneous) local states to another following the execution of actions
for all the agents in the system.
The notions of entitlement, penalty, etc., given by compliance with respect to a given set
of contracts are incorporated in the notions of protocol and transition. This will be exempli-
fied in the example of Section 6.1.
4For the above purposes we adopt the model of deontic interpreted systems [14] as ex-
tended to temporal models as in [15]. Formally, we assume a set of agents A = {1, . . . , n}
and an environment e.
To each agent i we associate a set of instantaneous local states Li and a set Le to the
environment. For each agent i we assume the set of local states Li = Gi ∪Ri is partitioned
into two subsets: Gi represents green (or ideal) local states, Ri represents the red (or non-
ideal). Intuitively Gi represents states of compliance with respect to the contracts the agent
i is subjected to, whereas Ri represents states of violation.
To represent the instantaneous configuration of the whole MAS at a given time we use
the notion of global state. A global state s ∈ S is a tuple s = (l1, . . . , ln, le) where each
component li ∈ Li represents the local state an agent i is in (these may be either a green or
a red state), together with the environment state. The set of all global states S ⊆ L1 × · · · ×
Ln × Le is a subset of the Cartesian product of all local states and the local states for the
environment. I ⊆ S is a set of initial states for the system.
The formal model we use accounts for the temporal evolution of the system. To do
this we assume Acti to be the set of actions available to agent i and similarly Acte to the
environment. It is assumed null ∈ Acti for each agent i where null is the null action.
Actions are selected by means of action selection mechanisms local to the agents; this is
formalised by local protocol functions Pi : Li → 2Acti for any i ∈ A. In other words Pi(li)
represents the actions that may be performed in the state li (irrespectively as to whether li is
a red or green state). Some of these actions will lead to green states for the agent, others to
red ones. A tuple (a1, . . . , an, ae) in which every component represents the action carried
out by an agent (the environment for the last component) is called a joint action.
The evolution of the system is given by locked transitions for all the agents and the
environment. The model assumes that each agent moves from one local state to another
local state at each time tick. The transitions between local states depend on which actions
have been performed by all agents in the system. So an agent’s action may affect a different
agent’s resulting next state. Although this is not enforced in the semantics, in any concrete
example we will impose that the colour of the resulting target state will be green or red
depending on the local action the agent performed. In other words other agents’ actions do
not have an impact on the colour of the target state; if necessary we can have two copies for a
certain local state, one green and one red, to differentiate outcomes depending on the agent’s
latest action and the ones of the rest of the system. Formally, for each agent we assume a
local transition function τi : Li × Act1 × . . . × Actn × Acte → Li defining the local state
for agent i resulting from a local state and and a joint action.
Local transitions are combined together (the model checker presented later will do pre-
cisely this) to give a joint transition function τ : S × Act1 × . . . × Actn × Acte → S,
i.e., τ = τ1 × . . . × τn × τe, giving the overall transition function for the system. We write
(s, s′) ∈ T if τ(s, a1, . . . , an, ae) = s′ for some joint action (a1, . . . , an, ae).
We introduce paths as standard to give an interpretation to a branching time language.
A path pi = (s0, s1, . . . , sj) is a sequence of possible global states such that (si, si+1) ∈ T
for each 0 ≤ i < j. For a path pi = (s0, s1, . . .), we take pi(k) = sk.
Definition 1 (Models) A model M = (S, I, T,∼1, . . . , ∼n, h) is a tuple such that:
– S ⊆ L1×, . . .× Ln × Le is the set of global states for the system,
– I ⊆ S is a set of initial states for the system,
– T is the temporal relation for the system defined as above,
– For each agent i∼i is an epistemic indistinguishably relation defined by (l1, . . . , ln, le) ∼i
(l′1, . . . , l′n, l′e) if li = l′i.
5– h : P → 2S is an interpretation for a set of propositional atoms P .
The above models allow us to interpret a temporal epistemic language. The relation T
will be used to interpret temporal operators whereas ∼i will be used to interpret epistemic
modalities as standard [13].
2.2 Syntax
Our formal language is a multi-modal logic including operators for branching time, epis-
temic operators and specialised local variables expressing correctness and violations. We
will see that by combining local propositions for violations and correctness with temporal
and epistemic operators we can express a variety of notions of compliance.
Definition 2 (Syntax) The syntax of the specification language is given by the following
BNF syntax:
φ ::= p | gi(i ∈ A) | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Kiφ | EXφ | EφUφ | EGφ
In the above definition p is an atomic proposition belonging to a set P that includes
the constants true and false. gi is an i-local atomic proposition expressing that “agent i is
presently in compliance (with respect to a set of contracts)”. We use gi as we will often say
that in this case “agent i is in a green state”. We sometimes write ri for ¬gi expressing that
“agent i is presently not in compliance”, or “agent i is in a red state”. The formula EXφ
stands for “there exists a path accessible from the present state in which φ holds at the next
state”; EφUψ stands for “there exists at least one path where ψ holds at some point in the
future and φ holds in all states until then”; EGφ stands for “there exists a path accessible
from the present state in which φ always holds at all future states”; Kiφ represents that
“agent i knows φ”. For examples and interpretation of the temporal epistemic fragment we
refer to specialised literature on the subject [13].
We can now interpret our logical language. In this paper we are only interested in those
states that can be reached from initial states when considering satisfaction of logic formulae.
Hence the set of states S in a model M is restricted to reachable states.
Definition 3 (Satisfaction) Satisfaction for a formula φ in a model M at a global state
s = (l1, . . . , ln, le), denoted as (M, s) |= φ, is defined recursively as follows:
– (M, s) |= true;
– (M, s) |= p if s ∈ h(p);
– (M, s) |= gi if li ∈ Gi;
– (M, s) |= ¬φ if (M, s) 6|= φ;
– (M, s) |= φ ∧ ψ if (M, s) |= φ and (M, s) |= ψ;
– (M, s) |= Kiφ if for all s′ ∈ S if s ∼i s′, then (M, s′) |= φ.
– (M, s) |= EXφ if there exists a path pi starting at s such that (M,pi(1)) |= φ;
– (M, s) |= EφUψ if there exists a path pi starting at s such that for some k ≥ 0
(M,pi(k)) |= ψ and (M,pi(j)) |= φ for all 0 ≤ j < k;
– (M, s) |= EGφ if there exists a path pi starting at s such that (M,pi(k)) |= φ for all
k ≥ 0;
The other connectives AX,AU,AG,EF,AF are defined via the above as standard [16].
For example, EFφ = E(trueUφ). Observe that the satisfaction condition for the epistemic
6modality depends on the local states of the agents and therefore the epistemic properties of
the system can be verified automatically.
The definition of satisfaction above is customary in temporal epistemic logic and only
extends the literature by adding propositional constants gi for compliance of agent i. The
approach used here is essentially the one presented in [17] to which time is added.
Often we are interested in establishing whether a model M representing a whole sys-
tem satisfies a specification φ, represented as M |= φ. In this case we will check whether
(M, s) |= φ for all s ∈ I.
By using the syntax above, intuitively we can express specifications representing prop-
erties in contract-regulated WS-compositions. For example, we may wish to reason about:
– what properties are brought about by a run of the system in which no agent violates any
of his contracts,
– what properties hold true if some of the agents violate (part of) their contracts,
– what knowledge the agents have about the consequences of some other agents violating
some of their contracts, and how this knowledge evolves over time.
These can serve as an intuition. The next section will provide further discussion on the
expressivity of the language.
3 Expressivity
We now formalise various notions of behavioural compliance with respect to a set of con-
tracts. In the following, we abstract from particular contracts the agents are subjected to
and instead present a general notion of compliance/violation. There are many dimensions
of possible investigation here: compliance may be local or global, it may hold for portions
or for the total length of a path, etc. We only focus on abstract notions here, and refer to
Section 6 to discuss the applicability of these in concrete scenarios.
The local behaviours of an agent may be classified distinctly into compliant and non-
compliant respectively. In crude terms, a compliant behaviour is one in which the agent is
always in a green state, whereas a non-compliant one results in some red states being visited.
3.1 Absolute compliance
We begin by analysing the notion of compliance of the local behaviour of an agent i over full
paths. In particular, we can distinguish between possible local compliance over a path (“there
exists a path in which agent i is always in a green state”) and a notion of full local compliance
(“in all paths agent i will always be in compliance”). The former can be expressed using the
syntax in Section 2 by
EGgi
and the latter by
AGgi.
The above allows us to specify easily the consequence of local compliance over full
paths for agents. For instance, if we need to express that “whenever agent i is in compliance
the state of affairs φ holds in the system,” we could state:
AG(gi → φ).
7Observe the above is a kind of Anderson-Kanger reduction [18,19].
Should we need to refer to states resulting from more than one agent being in compliance
we can obviously take the conjunction of the respective gi. For instance
AG(
^
i∈A′
gi → φ)
represents the fact that φ holds true whenever all agents in A′ ⊆ A are in compliance.
By allowing A′ to grow to represent the entire set of agents we can refer to “full global
compliance”
AG(
^
i∈A
gi → φ)
representing “whenever all agents in the system are in compliance φ holds.”
We can combine the above with knowledge modalities. For example we may want to
express that an agent i knows that as long as agent j is in compliance a certain state of
affairs is always reachable in some way. This may be expressed by
Ki(AG(gj → EXφ)).
Obviously more complex specifications are expressible and, indeed, useful.
3.2 Consequences of violations
In addition to the above, we may be interested in what consequences arise should one agent
not be in compliance. For instance we may wish to express that following a violation by
agent i a certain state of affairs holds indefinitely and that all other agents know this. This is
expressible by the formula
AG(¬gi → AGφ) ∧
^
j 6=i
Kj(AG(¬gi → AGφ)).
This may be useful to represent the knowledge the agents have with respect to the conse-
quences of one agent defaulting on his obligations.
Often we are interested in the notion of “recovery”. Following a local violation, perhaps
there is a way in the system for the agent to recover. Recovery is here simply represented
as a transition an agent makes from a red state to a green state. A possible local recovery is
expressible in the language defined in Section 2 as
AG(¬gi → EFgi).
In the language above we also can easily express that all agents always know this,
AG(
^
i∈A
KiAG(¬gi → EFgi)).
Observe that the simple red/green labelling only offers rather coarse expressivity. In general
a contract may have several clauses. In some circumstances an agent could be in violation
of one clause only, while in others of several or all clauses: the formalism above cannot dis-
tinguish situations of this kind. For this reason, we cannot express recovery with respect to a
particular clause. As noted earlier it is possible to extend the deontic interpreted formalisms
with further labelling to allow for this; for simplicity we do not do this here.
8Similar formulas may be introduced describing recovery for global violations as well.
The reader will fill in these details easily.
Assuming an agent begins a run in a green state, there are at least four classes of evolu-
tion that are of interest as shown in Figure 1.
Unrecovered
violations Recovery
Total
complianceOverall
red state
green state
Fig. 1 Various evolutions from an initial green state.
– Overall behaviours: These are behaviours which are represented by paths that have both
red and green states in no particular order. These behaviours specify the general, overall
behaviour for an agent.
– Totally compliant behaviours: These are behaviours represented by paths covering only
green states. The transitions occur when the observed behaviour is in compliance with
the contract-compliant behaviour. If a model includes such a path, it satisfies the speci-
fication EGgi.
– Unrecovered violations behaviours: These are behaviours represented by paths where
all states in a given prefix are green, but whose suffix are red. Behaviours represented
by such transitions represent non-recoverable behaviours from a violation. The formula
E(giUEG¬gi) is true in models that include these paths.
– Recovery behaviours: These are behaviours represented by paths where all states in
some suffix of the path are green, but some states in its prefix are red. The formula
E(giU (¬gi ∧ EF EGgi)) is true in models containing at least one of these paths.
But other possibilities exist. For example, we may wish to reason in terms of how many
times an agent is in a violation state in a path. The case of two violations may be ex-
pressed as:
E(gi U (¬gi ∧ EX E(giU(¬gi ∧ EX EGgi)))).
We present a realistic WS scenario in Section 6 and analyse it in view of the above.
4 Verification framework
In this section we present the framework, illustrated in Figure 2, here adopted for the veri-
fication of contract regulated MAS implementing web services. For the sake of clarity, the
figure only refers to the methodology for agent C1. In the actual toolkit similar mechanisms
are replicated for all the agents in the composition.
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haviours (ABs), and the set of contractually compliant behaviours (CCBs). Both sets can in
principle be given by means of any transition based structure or program defining it. ABs
denote the set of transitions that the agent, or the service, can in principle engage in irre-
spective of the contracts it has signed up to. For instance, a service may in principle fail to
perform certain actions even under the obligation of doing so, or perform actions in viola-
tion with certain clauses in specific contracts pertaining to its behaviours. In contrast CCBs
denote the set of transitions that arise when the agent acts without deviating from the con-
tracts in question. Note both sets are in principle non-deterministic and in general involve
an element of synchronisation with the other agents’ actions.
We should wish to be able to consider CCBs as defined by an ad-hoc contract language
such as [20,21] that can be interleaved with ABs taken directly from the agent’s code. How-
ever, interfacing a contract based language to a description of all possible behaviours of an
agent is an unresolved problem beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, in line with our cur-
rent interests in concrete applications, we assume to have both ABs and CCBs to be given
in BPEL [10], the leading language for the implementation of web services.
In our experience most industrial use cases involving contracts are currently analysed by
considering the contract compliant scenarios, i.e., by investigating the CCBs traces. These
are often very well understood and described with a range of formal or semi-formal ma-
chinery, including transition systems, state charts, and automata. ABs are in some instances
poorly analysed and, indeed, it is often because of this, that unwanted outcomes are reached
in the service composition. Still, even in the worst case where ABs are not documented in
any semi-formal form, ultimately they can be reconstructed from the actual code run by the
service. This typically abstracts from the contracts themselves; i.e., the clauses are not rep-
resented explicitly in the code, but the agent’s code implicitly governs the circumstances in
which the agent follows the contracts or otherwise.
As we describe in the next section in more detail, by using ABs and CCBs in conjunction
we can colour the overall resulting model and verify the agents’ behaviours against their
contract-compliant runs. Specifically, we wish to be able to analyse:
– the extent to which an individual agent’s behaviour follows the contracts it is supposed
to adhere to, and, if not, the extent to which recovery actions are executed by the agent
as well as their outcome.
– the extent to which the overall system achieves the intended outcomes of the composi-
tion when all, or certain contracts are followed. In case of failure we wish to be able to
analyse the critical components that can negatively affect the outcome of the composi-
tion.
In our approach, a key ingredient for the aims described above is the compiler BPEL-
toISPL. BPELtoISPL takes as input an agent’s ABs and CCBs in BPEL and produces an
ISPL program to be used with the MCMAS model checker [22]. As described below in
more detail, the compiler parses the ABs (given in BPEL) to generate a preliminary pro-
gram enumerating the local states. The CCBs is then parsed to colour the agent’s states
in terms of compliance (green) or non-compliance (red), as well as basic propositions en-
coding this. The compiler then adds a number of basic specifications to be checked before
prompting the user to add any further properties of interest.
Before presenting the compiler in detail in Section 5, we introduce below the BPEL
language, the MCMAS model checker and its input language ISPL.
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Fig. 2 Verification architecture
4.1 WSBPEL
BPEL [10] is a popular and de facto industrial standard for describing service composition,
and extends the traditional web services interaction model and provides support for business
transactions. Specifically, BPEL is a language for the formal specification of business pro-
cesses and business interaction protocols. It defines a model and an XML based grammar
for the orchestration of business processes.
From an architectural point of view BPEL sits on a layer above the Web Service Descrip-
tion Language (WSDL): permitted operations are stated in WSDL, while their sequencing
is expressed in BPEL. BPEL provides the infrastructure for describing the control logic
required to coordinate web services participating in a process flow. This is useful for spec-
ifying both abstract and executable business processes. An executable process models the
behaviour of participants in a specific business interaction, essentially modelling a private
workflow. Abstract processes, modelled as business protocols in BPEL, specify the pub-
lic message exchanges between parties. Business protocols are not executable and do not
convey the internal details of a process flow. In other words, executable processes provide
the orchestration support, while business protocols focus more on the choreography of the
services.
By adopting BPEL the engineer can abstract from the underlying web services imple-
mentations; so the business process language effectively becomes a web services API. BPEL
utilises WS-Transaction (WS-Coordination) [23] to ensure reliable execution of business
processes over multiple workflows, which BPEL logically divides into two distinct aspects.
The first is a process description language with support for performing computation, syn-
chronous and asynchronous operation invocations, control-flow patterns, structured error
handling, and long-running business transactions. The second is an infrastructure layer that
builds on WSDL to capture the relationships between enterprises and processes within a web
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services-based environment. Taken together, these two aspects support the orchestration of
web services in a business process, where the infrastructure layer exposes web services to
the process layer, which then drives that web services infrastructure as part of its workflow
activities. BPEL is normally interpreted and executed by an orchestration engine controlled
by one of the participating parties. The engine coordinates the various activities in the pro-
cess, and compensates the system when errors occur.
The building blocks for a BPEL process are the descriptions of the parties participating
in the process, the data that flows through the process and the activities performed during the
execution of the process. Some examples of activities include “receive”, “reply”, “assign”,
“sequence” and “wait”. BPEL also introduces systematic mechanisms for dealing with busi-
ness exceptions and processing faults. Moreover, BPEL introduces a mechanism to define
how individual or composite activities within a unit of work are to be compensated in cases
where exceptions occur or a partner requests reversal. We refer the interested reader to [10]
for more details.
4.2 MCMAS and ISPL
MCMAS [22] is a model checker tailored to the verification of multi-agent systems. MC-
MAS differs from mainstream model checkers such as NuSMV, SPIN, etc., in that it enables
the engineer to verify not only temporal properties but also epistemic, ATL, and other ex-
pressive agent-based logics. MCMAS takes as input a MAS model description and a set of
specifications to be checked, and it returns the truth value of these on the system provided.
MCMAS is fully symbolic checker employing on Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams for
efficient representations. Whenever possible, MCMAS produces counterexamples for un-
satisfied specifications and witnesses executions for those satisfied. This provides detailed
guidance to the engineer in case a revision of the system is required. MCMAS handles fair-
ness efficiently and has been tested on a number of scenarios [22].
The input to MCMAS is given by means of ISPL programs. ISPL (Interpreted Systems
Programming Language) is a dedicated agent-based modelling language derived from the
formalism of interpreted systems, a popular semantics for the formalisation of MAS [13].
ISPL programs, not dissimilarly to most model checking languages, govern the evolution of
agent variables and their interaction by means of Boolean expressions.
MCMAS supports a number of advanced features including variable typing, interactive
execution, as well as a range of content-assist input and analysis features in a graphical user
interface.
The self-explanatory ISPL program in Table 1 encodes the well-known Train/Controller
scenario with one train only and one controller. It can easily be ascertained that ISPL pro-
grams uniquely denote interpreted systems as defined above in Section 2.1. Indeed, an
agent’s instantiation describes its local states (including an optional green and red colour-
ing of its states) as a tuple of its typed variables, its actions, its protocol, and its evolution
function. The evaluation function defines satisfaction of basic atoms in view of Boolean
combinations of agents’ local states. Initial states for the system, any fairness conditions,
and specifications to be checked are also defined in an ISPL formula. In this snippet the
(satisfied) specification stating that “whenever train 1 is in the tunnel, train 1 knows the light
is green” is passed on to MCMAS for verification.
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Table 1 ISPL snippet for the Train/Controller.
Agent Environment
Vars:
state: {green, red};
end Vars
Actions = {enter1, leave1};
Protocol:
state = green: {enter1};
state = red: {leave1};
end Protocol
Evolution:
state=green if state=red and
Train1.Action=leave;
state=red if state=green and
Train1.Action=enter;
end Evolution
end Agent
InitStates
Environment.state=green and
Train1.state=wait;
end InitStates
Formulae
AG(in_tunnel1->K(Train1,greenlight));
end Formulae
Agent Train1
Vars:
state: {wait, tunnel, away};
end Vars
Actions = {enter, leave, back};
Protocol:
state = wait: {enter};
state = tunnel: {leave};
state = away: {back};
end Protocol
Evolution:
state=wait if state=away and
Action=back;
state=tunnel if state=wait and
Environment.Action=enter1;
state=away if state=tunnel and
Environment.Action=leave1;
end Evolution
end Agent
Evaluation
in_tunnel1 if Train1.state=tunnel;
greenlight if Environment.state=green;
end Evaluation
5 Automatic compilation from WSBPEL into ISPL
The core component of our framework, shown in Figure 2, is the BPELtoISPL compiler
translating a BPEL specification into an ISPL program representing the system to be checked.
As we discuss below, in addition to the model generation expressed in ISPL, BPELtoISPL
also automatically generates basic atomic propositions and properties to be checked by MC-
MAS. The internal architecture of the compiler is illustrated in Figure 3 showing a three
step construction to generate the corresponding ISPL program from the ABs and CCBs for
the system. In a nutshell this is as follows.
1. ABs and CCBs for each BPEL process are read into memory and translated into two
corresponding automata. We call contract automaton the automaton representing CCBs
for the service in question and behaviour automaton the one representing ABs.
2. We systematically compare the two generated automata. Specifically, starting from the
initial state for each state in the behaviour automaton we look for its counterpart in
the contract automaton. If this exists, the state is contract compliant, so we label it as
green; if not, we label it as red. We proceed with labelling all the states of the behaviour
automaton.
3. The resulting labelled behaviour automaton is encoded in ISPL as an agent with red and
green states as described in Section 2 as well as transitions corresponding to the BPEL
moves. Atoms encoding red states are automatically written in the ISPL output as well
as basic specifications. The resulting ISPL file is used by MCMAS for model checking
the system.
In what follows we recall the basic automata definitions and discuss the methodology in
detail.
5.1 Automata and their semantics
An automaton is a tuple 〈V ar, C, F, S, S0, Σ,E〉 where
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– V ar is a finite set of variables. Each variable x is defined on a domain Rx;
– C is a finite set of assertions over the set of variables V ar;
– F is a finite set of assignments of the form x := expr, where x ∈ V ar and expr is an
expression over V ar in the domain of x;
– S is a finite set of states;
– S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states;
– Σ is a finite set of labels;
– E is the set of transitions over S ×Σ × C × 2F × S. A transition e ∈ E can be written
as s
σ;c;f−−−→ s′ where s ∈ S is the source state, s′ ∈ S the target state, σ ∈ Σ expresses
synchronisation conditions with different automata, c ∈ C is the enabling condition (or
the guard) and the postconditions f ⊆ F encode assignments over the variables.
Semantics
As standard we define automata semantics in terms of their executions. An execution is a
possibly infinite sequence of pairs of the form 〈si, vi〉, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . }, where
1. s0 ∈ S0,
2. si is a state from S and vi is an evaluation for the variables in V ar.
3. Let vi(x) be the value of x in vi. For each adjacent pair 〈si, vi〉 〈si+1, vi+1〉, the au-
tomaton displays a transition e = si
σ;c;f−−−→ si+1, where the assertion c is evaluated as
true over vi, and for each variable x ∈ V ar, vi+1(x) = expr if there is an assignment
(x := expr) ∈ f ; otherwise, vi+1(x) = vi(x).
A system composed by a number of automata A1, . . . , An synchronises by shared ac-
tions as follows. For each label σ ∈ Σ = Σi ∪ . . . ∪Σn we write Aσ = {Ai | σ ∈ Σi, 1 ≤
i ≤ n}. A transition ei ∈ Ei in Ai with label σ is executed synchronously if and only if each
automaton Aj ∈ Aσ (i 6= j) executes a transition labelled with σ. This is formally defined
in the product of automata.
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The product of automata
Let A1 = 〈V ar1, C1, F1, S1, S10 , Σ1, E1〉 and A2 = 〈V ar2, C2, F2, S2, S20 , Σ2, E2〉 be two
automata. The product automaton, denoted A1 ‖ A2, is the automaton 〈V ar1 ∪ V ar2, C1 ∪
C2, F1∪F2, S1×S2, S10×S20 , Σ1∪Σ2, E〉. Given a set f ⊆ Fi of assignments, let var(f) ⊆
V ari be the set of variable being assigned new values by f . The set of transitionsE is defined
as follows.
– For a label σ ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2 and two transitions e1 = s1
σ;c1;f1−−−−→ s′1 in E1 and e2 =
s2
σ;c2;f2−−−−→ s′2 in E2 such that var(f1) ∩ var(f2) = ∅, we have (s1, s2)
σ;c1∧c2;f1∪f2−−−−−−−−−→
(s′1, s′2) ∈ E
– For a label σ ∈ Σ1\Σ2 and a transition s1
σ;c1;f1−−−−→ s′1 ∈ E1, we have (s1, s2)
σ;c1;f1−−−−→
(s′1, s2) ∈ E for every s2 ∈ S2.
– For a label σ ∈ Σ2\Σ1 and a transition s2
σ;c2;f2−−−−→ s′2 ∈ E1, we have (s1, s2)
σ;c2;f2−−−−→
(s1, s
′
2) ∈ E for every s1 ∈ S1.
In what follows, we omit labels for simplicity, as well as assignments.
5.2 Translating BPEL programs into automata
BPELtoISPL translates BPEL activity constructs into automata transitions associating be-
ginning and end states to the corresponding source and target automaton states recursively.
Our translation follows closely the one presented in [24]; we differ from [24] by adding
a translation of the BPEL activity “pick”. The added translation is in line with the others
already presented [24] and warrant no particular discussion (but see the full list presented
below). Note that BPEL has no uniformly accepted formal semantics. In addition to [24],
other translations have been put forward [25–28]. We chose to follow [24] because it is
based on automata and therefore particularly suitable to our aims.
The translator of our realisation uses the following rules.
– A BPEL “assign” activity is composed by a list of assignments. Thus it can be translated
as a transition directly with true as its guard. The beginning state of the activity is the
source state of the transition and the end state is the target state. An “empty” activity can
be seen as a special “assign” activity with no assignments.
– BPEL “receive” or “invoke” activities are translated into transitions in which the begin-
ning state and the end state are the source and the target state of the transition respec-
tively. If an “invoke” activity sends a value expr through the message channel and the
corresponding “receive” activity assigns that value to a variable x, we consider the as-
signment in “invoke” to be y := expr and the one in “receive” to be x := y, where y is a
temporary variable to complete the assignments in “invoke” and “receive”. Furthermore
we impose that each transition resulting from an “invoke” activity is synchronised (as
defined above) to the corresponding transition resulting from the “invoke” activity. The
key end result is that the assignment x := expr in the corresponding automaton.
– A BPEL “sequence” activity is composed of a sequence of activities a1, . . . , an. Assume
the beginning and end states of each ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are si and s′i respectively. The
“sequence” activity merges s′i and si+1 into one state for (1 ≤ i ≤ n−1). The beginning
state of the “sequence” is s1 and the end state is s′n.
15
– A BPEL “if” activity has a cond logical condition and two execution branches, i.e.,
the then branch and the else branch. Assume that in the translated automaton the then
branch starts from the state s1 and finishes at the state s′1, and, similarly, the else branch
starts from s2 terminating at s′2. We translate the “if” activity by generating a new state
s and two transitions with empty assignments such that s cond−→ s1 and s ¬cond−→ s2, and
collapse s2 and s′2 into one state s′. The beginning and end states are encoded as s and
s′ respectively.
– A BPEL “while” activity is composed of a loop condition cond and a loop body, which
we assume is translated into an automaton beginning at state s1 and ending at s′1. To
encode the “while” activity we add a new state s preceding the translation of the body,
and a new state s2 encoding the end state. Then we generate two transitions with empty
assignments such that s cond−→ s1 and s ¬cond−→ s2, and finally merge s′1 with s.
– A BPEL “pick” activity is composed of a list of “onMessage” activities or “onAlarm”
activities. These can be seen as a multi-branch “if” activity. Therefore, similarly to the
“if” activity case, we generate a new state s to be the beginning state of the “pick”
activity and merge all end states of the “onMessage” or “onAlarm” activities to be the
end state of the “pick” activity. Each “onMessage” activity is translated in the same way
as the “receive” activities described above. Each “onAlarm” activity is translated into a
transition whose guard is the encoding of the activity’s triggering condition and whose
assignment list is empty.
– BPEL branches of “flow” activities are executed concurrently. To translate them into
automata we generate a separate automaton to model each branch as follows. We gen-
erate two new states s0i and s
1
i for branch i and two transitions e
0
i = s
0
i
true−→ si and
e1i = s
′
i
true−→ s1i , where si is the beginning state of the branch and s′i the end state. Ad-
ditionally we generate three states s0, s1 and s2 in the main automaton corresponding
to the BPEL process with the transitions e0 = s0
true;−→ s1, and e1 = s1 true−→ s2. The
state s0 is the beginning state of the “flow” activity and s2 is its end state. Furthermore,
we synchronise each e0i to e0, and each e
1
i to e1. In doing so, we differ from [24], where
a “flow” is translated in a way in which all branches are executed sequentially and all
possible permutations are represented as a single automaton. The approach used here
removes several duplicate transitions, thereby making the translation more efficient.
The automata generated from “if”, “while”, “pick” and “flow” activities are illustrated
in Figure 4.
– BPEL fault handlers and exceptions are translated into transitions as well. To do this
we assign a specific value to a variable and add a test in the preceding transition with
the guard being the value for the particular variable. Other BPEL handlers are dealt
with in the same way. In every state where an exception could happen a copy of the
exception/handler transition is produced using this state as its source state (note that
these copies have the same target state). While this is correct, observe that doing so
would cause one transition to be replicated several times. For efficiency reasons the
ISPL code generated is further optimised as we discuss later.
By using the translation above, BPELtoISPL builds the contract automaton from the input
BPEL CCBs and the behaviour automaton from the input BPEL ABs.
Once the automata for the BPEL translation have been built following the algorithm
above, BPELtoISPL proceeds to colour the behaviour automaton in terms of states of com-
pliance and violation. Once this is done, an ISPL file representing the behaviours and the
violation states is produced (see Figure 5). Recall from the previous section that in our initial
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Fig. 5 Generation of ISPL contractually correct behaviours
specification the set of CCBs is included in all ABs. As a consequence of this, by following
the construction above we obtain a contract automaton that is included in the behaviour au-
tomaton. Note that the recovery transitions, taking red states to green ones, are also included
in the behaviour automaton. More formally, an automatonA′ = 〈V ar′, C′, F ′, S′, S′0, Σ′, E′〉
is included in A if S′0 = S0, V ar′ = V ar, C′ = C, F ′ = F , Σ′ = Σ, S′ ⊆ S, and
E′ = E\E′′, where E′′ is the set of transitions whose source state or target state is not in
S′.
Once the contract automaton and the behaviour automaton have been constructed the
toolkit proceeds with labelling the states of the behaviour automaton as states of contract
compliance (green) or violation (red). To achieve this, BPELtoISPL operates as follows.
1. The initial state of the behaviour automaton is labelled as green.
2. For every transition in the contract automata, the algorithm finds the same transition
in the behaviour automata (since each contract automaton is included in a behaviour
automaton, this step is guaranteed to succeed) and labels its target state as green.
3. All states left in the behaviour automata that have not been labelled (i.e., that are not
green) are labelled as red.
Observe that we do not look for matched states directly because these are named numer-
ically during compilation and therefore the same numbered state in the behaviour automata
and the contract automata might correspond to different states. However, transitions get their
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name from the BPEL activities, each of which has a unique name, thereby guaranteeing the
correctness of the above. The end result of the translation above are the resulting labelled
behaviour automata which can now be translated into ISPL for verification.
5.3 Generating the ISPL program
Once the behaviour automata are labelled they can easily be compiled in ISPL for verifica-
tion (see Section 2). Each automaton is mapped to an agent construct in the ISPL program.
Let A = {A1, . . . ,An} be the set of automata and A = {1, . . . , n} the set of agents. To
instantiate an ISPL agent we need to define its basic features, e.g., its set of local states,
actions, protocols, evolution function, as well as other system parameters, such as the initial
states, propositions, etc. In the following we define the key steps to generate an agent i ∈ A
from an automaton Ai ∈ A.
1. Local states generation. A local state l ∈ Li is a valuation for the set of local variables
V ari. Thus, the generation of Li is performed through the generation of V ari. If Ai is
generated from a BPEL process p, then we set
V ari = V arp ∪ {state},
where V arp is the set of variables defined in p and state is an additional enumeration
variable. Each value of state represents a unique state of Ai. If Ai is a “flow” branch in
p, then we assign
V ari = V ar
′
p ∪ {state},
where V ar′p ⊆ V arp is the set of variables used by Ai. In order to reduce the agent’s
state space, the compiler monitors the usage of every variable v ∈ V arp. If v is never
read by any transitions in Ai, then it is discarded from the agent’s description in the
ISPL file.
2. Local actions generation. Acti is obtained from the transitions of the corresponding Ai.
Each transition generates a different action for the agent in question; if two transitions
have the same name, they are mapped into the same action.
3. Protocol generation. For any transition t whose source state is represented by l(state),
the action to which t is mapped is included in the set of allowed actions in l. Obviously,
two states l1, l2 ∈ Li have the same set of allowed actions if l1(state) = l2(state).
4. Evolution function generation. Each transition inAi is translated into an agent evolution
item. For a transition t with source state s1, target state s2, and guard c, the evolution
item is defined to be of the following form:
state=s2 if state=s1 and c and Action=t.
This evolution item encodes that if in the current state the variable state has value s1
and the guard c is satisfied, the execution of t forces agent i to move to a state where
state has value s2.
If t is synchronised with another transition t′ in the automaton Aj ∈ A, then the evolu-
tion item is generated as
state=s2 if state=s1 and c and Action=t and Aj .Action=t’.
The above forces synchronisation between the agents through the joint action t, t′ cor-
responding to the shared actions in the original automata.
If t assigns a value expr to a variable v, the assignment is translated by forcing the value
to acquire the required value as follows:
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state=s2 and v=expr if · · · .
If there are multiple copies of t, e.g., t represents a fault handler, we use the following
form to specify an evolution item for all copies:
state=s if (state=s1 or state=s2 or . . .) and c and Action=t and · · · ,
where s1 and s2 are the source states of the t copies and s is their target state. If t is
allowed in all states, the above form is simplified as
state=s if c and Action=t and · · · .
The compiler translates all behaviour automata into an ISPL program as described
above. In addition to the agents definitions, ISPL also requires the user to specify the initial
states, the atomic propositions and the specifications to be checked. We only describe initial
states here and leave the others for the next subsection.
5. Initial states. Since a BPEL process is a sequential program, each process has only one
initial state. So every automaton Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) has one initial state l0i . The global
initial state s0 is constructed as
nV
i=1
l0i . This is written in the ISPL file in the appropriate
syntax.
5.4 Automatically generated specifications
In addition to compiling the model, as described above, BPELtoISPL additionally encodes a
range of simple specifications to be checked by MCMAS. For each agent i generated in the
translation process, the following local atomic propositions are generated by the compiler
as follows.
– an atomic local proposition pgreeni , holding on the green states of agent i, is defined;
– an atomic proposition pendi , holding in the last state of all runs in which the contractual
obligations of agent i have been met, is defined;
– an atomic proposition predi holding in all red states for agent i is defined.
Observe that while each ISPL agent originates from one and only one BPEL process,
a BPEL service may be translated by means of several agents. It is however possible to
refer to the contract compliant states of a BPEL process by taking the conjunction of local
propositions referring to the green states of the agents the process is mapped to. Formally, we
can consider pgreen = ∧ipgreeni to represent the contract compliant states of BPEL process
pwhere i ranges over the ISPL agents process pwas translated to. The toolkit produces these
propositions automatically and generates some simple specifications as below. For ease of
presentation we assume below every BPEL process is translated into a single agent below (as
it happens whenever BPEL “flow” activities are not present); the toolkit handles the general
case by means of appropriate conjunctions.
Five basic specifications are generated based on the atomic propositions above. Specifi-
cally, for each BPEL process p, the toolkit automatically checks the following formulas:
EG pgreen (1)
E (pgreen U pend) (2)
EF pred (3)
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AG (pred → AFpend) (4)
AG (pred → EFpend) (5)
The first specification, also discussed in Section 3, expresses the fact that there exists a run
in which process p remains always in a state of full compliance with respect to its contracts.
Note this specification does not insist on the process actually terminating its run as defined
in the BPEL model. Specification (2) refines this concept further by stating that there exists
a way for process p to terminate while always remaining in a green state; i.e., there is a
way for process p to conduct a contract-compliant run leading to termination of the process.
These are properties that we would expect to be satisfied in the composition; if not, we are in
the presence of a system in which process p has no way of executing without braking some
of the contracts it has adhered to. This provides us with a very coarse validation criteria for
the contract regulated composition. Still, this is a feature that can reveal errors either in the
BPEL behaviours as programmed, or in the contracts as implemented.
For example, if Specification (1) is satisfied and Property (2) is not, this might mean
that the service in question cannot make any progress after some other services violate their
contract.
Specification (3) represents a test to check whether an agent may in principle violate
its contractual behaviours; Property (4) tests whether the service can always recover from
any violation. Note that if Property (3) is not satisfied, then Property (4) will always hold.
If both properties are satisfied, we deduce the service may violate some of its contracts but
it will always eventually recover from these violations and terminate correctly. Conversely,
if Property (3) is satisfied but Property (4) is not, the service is shown not to always recover
after some violation of its contracts. A weaker variant of Specification (4) is Specifica-
tion (5) simply stating that following any violation there is a path leading to recovery and
termination. It is instructive to use properties (3,) (4), and (5) in conjunction; e.g, should
Specifications (4), (5) be false, we may wish to check the models to establish whether this
is indeed a feature of the scenario, or whether we should alter the behaviour of the agent to
rectify its exhibited properties.
These are just basic properties pertaining to a single service only. Similar properties can
be compiled for the overall system’s behaviour considering appropriate conjunctions of the
local propositions defined above.
While the compiler generates the properties above automatically for the benefit of the
user, for a given system the engineer may wish to explore more complex specifications for
the composition. We explore some possibilities in Section 6 while discussing a case study.
6 Experimental Analysis
In this section we present a composition of services whose behaviours are regulated by
contracts. We also show the verification results obtained by means of the technique above.
As stated earlier, we are not concerned with contract negotiation here. Instead we assume
all contracts have been negotiated before execution.
6.1 A Motivating Case Study
In the scenario we analyse (see Figure 6) the participating contract parties comprise: a prin-
cipal software provider (PSP ), a software provider (SP ), a software client (C), an insurance
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company (I), a testing agency (T ), a hardware supplier (H), and a technical expert (E). The
high-level workflow of the composition is defined as follows: Client C would like a piece
of software developed and deployed on hardware supplied by H . To deploy the software, a
technical expertE is needed. Components of the software are provided by different software
providers. We consider two software providers here: PSP and SP . The components need to
be integrated by the providers before the software is delivered to C. The software integration
is carried out by PSP , after SP delivers its component. This happens before any integration
has taken place.
Before then PSP and SP twice update each other and C about the progress of the
software development. Should the client wish to update the software specification, he can
request this at no cost before the second round of updates. Any change required by the client
after the second update is considered a violation of the original contract and the client may
be charged a penalty at PSP ’s discretion. If the penalty is levied, the client can recover from
this violation by paying the penalty or by withdrawing the request for changes. If PSP and
SP do not send their updates as per schedule, this is also considered a violation and they
may be charged a penalty. Every update is followed by a part payment by C to the PSP .
Payment to SP is handled by PSP and is done once the software is deployed successfully.
After PSP has integrated the components, he sends the integrated software to T for
testing. Results from testing are made available to all the parties, i.e., PSP , SP , and C.
If the integration test fails, the components are revised and tested again. Components can
be revised twice. If the third test fails, C may cancel the contract with PSP . If the testing
succeeds, C invokes I to get the software insured. C then invokes H to order the hardware.
Finally C invokes E to get the software deployed. If the software cannot be deployed then
the hardware and the components have to be re-evaluated. Software components can be
revised twice at no penalty. If the third test fails C cancels the contract with PSP and H .
Figure 7 summarises the obligations of the PSP and C. Figure 8 illustrates informally some
of the conditions under which some local violations may occur.
From the above scenario it can be seen that a notion of correctness for each party can be
deduced from the contracts applicable to them. Any deviation from the behaviour identified
in the contract is considered a violation. The contract also specifies mechanisms for recover-
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PSP ’s obligations:
1. Update SP and C twice about the progress of the software.
2. Integrate the components and send them to T for testing.
3. If components fail, revise the software, integrate the revised software and send them for testing.
4. Make payment to SP after successful deployment of software.
C’s obligations:
1. Refrain to request any changes after the second round of updates.
2. Pay penalty if changes are requested after second round of updates.
3. Make payment to the PSP after every update.
Fig. 7 Obligations of Contract parties.
Agent Violation condition Recovery
1 PSP - fails to send messages to SP and/orC in
the first and/or second run of update.
pay penalty charge
2 - fails to send payment to SP . N/A
3 SP - fails to send update messages to PSP or
C.
pay penalty charge
4 - fails to send its components to PSP . N/A
5 C - request changes after second update. pay penalty charge or withdraw changes
6 - fails to send the payment to PSP . N/A
7 T - fails to send the testing report to C,
PSP and/or SP .
N/A
8 H - fails to deliver the hardware system toC. N/A
9 - ignores the deployment failure. N/A
10 E - fails to deploy the software on the hard-
ware system.
N/A
11 I - fails to process the claim of C. N/A
Fig. 8 Agents and their violation conditions.
ing from violations. While the scenario may seem artificially constructed, it is actually taken
almost verbatim from a software procurement workflow of a leading IT industry.
6.2 Basic model
We evaluated our compilation and verification mechanism on the case study above. We
represented the composition in terms of a BPEL orchestration. The following BPEL code
represents the full behaviour of the client C, when receiving updates from PSP and SP .
Note that for brevity, only essential information is shown. The BPEL-contract is the same
as BPEL-behaviour except that it defines only contractually correct and therefore limited
behaviours.
<pick name="Update1">
<onMessage partnerLink="PSP_C"
operation="recPSP" portType="ns1:recMsg"
variable="RecPSPIn">
<empty name="Empty1"/>
</onMessage>
<onMessage partnerLink="PSP_C_int"
operation="recPSP" portType="ns1:recMoney"
variable="SendSPIn1">
<receive name="recUpdate1"
createInstance="no" partnerLink="PSP_C1"
operation="recPSP" portType="ns1:recMsg"
variable="RecPSPIn">
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</receive>
</onMessage>
<onMessage partnerLink="PSP_NoC"
operation="recNoPSP" portType="ns1:recMsg"
variable="RecPSPIn">
<exit name="Exit347"/>
</onMessage>
</pick>
The translation generates the following ISPL program for the client.
Agent Client
Vars:
state : { Client_0, Client_1, ...};
count : 0 .. 3;
...
end Vars
Actions={Client_Upd1_0, Client_Upd1_1,...};
Protocol :
state=Client_0:{Client_Upd1_0, Client_Upd1_1,
Client_Upd1_2, Client_While1};
state=Client_1:{Client_Empty1};
...
end Protocol
Evolution :
state=Client_0 and count=count+1 if
state=Client_24 and Action=Client_Assign375;
state=Client_1 if state = Client_0 and
count<2 and Action = Client_Upd1_0 and
PSP.Action = PSP_updateClient;
...
end Evolution
end Agent
The following listing gives an example about how to define atomic propositions and
properties in ISPL.
Evaluation
Client_green if Client.state = Client_0 or
Client.state = Client_1 or ...;
Client_end if Client.state = Client_51;
Client_red0 if Client.state = Client_11;
...
end Evaluation
Formulae
E ( Client_green U Client_end );
EF Client_red0;
...
end Formulae
In addition to the basic properties automatically generated by the compiler, we manually
added a few more complex properties to the model. Those properties were also studied
in [11,12]. Some atomic propositions, e.g., “receiveSoftware” and “softwareTested”, were
also added to the ISPL code manually to test further specifications as we describe below.
6.3 Further specifications
In this subsection we formalise various properties of compliance (or lack of) for the moti-
vating case study outlined in Section 6.1 using the syntax defined in Section 2.
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– Whenever PSP is in a green state (i.e., is in a state of compliance), he knows the contract
can be eventually fulfilled successfully. We encode this as:
AG(PSP green→ KPSPEF (PSP end)) (6)
Intuitively this property should not hold in the example above because even though PSP
remains in compliance, the software might either fail to pass the testing phase or not be
deployed. Conversely the following two specifications should be satisfied.
– There exists a path whereC is always in compliance with the contract until he eventually
receives the software.
E(C green U receiveSoftware) (7)
– In some of the paths where PSP and SP are always in compliance, the software can be
eventually integrated and tested.
E((PSP green ∧ SP green)U(softwareIntegrated ∧ EFsoftwareTested)) (8)
– PSP knows that it is possible that PSP , SP , C, I, H , T and E are all in compliance
until the software is delivered.
KPSPE(all green U softwareDelivered), (9)
where all green represents PSP green∧SP green∧C green∧T Green∧H green∧
E green ∧ I green. While it would be reasonable for this specification to hold in the
scenario, in the BPEL we analysed this specification resulted false because of a possible
livelock of the testing agent. This is potentially a finding that would lead to a revision in
the implementation.
– There is a trace in which the client is always in contract compliant states until the soft-
ware is delivered (while the client remains compliant) before the client enters a violation.
E(C green UE((C green ∧ softwareDeployed) U ¬C green)) (10)
This specification is satisfied in the BPEL code tested because the client may not honour
the final payment.
– It is possible that SP is always in compliance before failing to provide the component
requested by the PSP forever.
E(SP green U EG(¬SP green ∧ componentNotProvided)) (11)
The following two specifications are satisfied in the scenario.
– PSP might not send the first update to C as per schedule and might only send it after
paying a penalty to C. However from then on, PSP may always in compliance.
E(PSP greenU (¬PSP green ∧ noFirstUpdate∧
EX(payPenalty ∧ EG PSP green))) (12)
– It is possible that C withdraws the request for a change made after the second update.
EF E((¬C green ∧ illegalRequest) U (C green ∧ withdrawRequest)) (13)
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The generated ISPL model was encoded automatically by MCMAS by using 134 BDD
variables: 49 BDD variables for local states (the same number of BDD variables are con-
structed for the transition relation) and 36 for local actions. The total number of global states
is approximately 106. On a machine running Fedora 13 (kernel 2.6.36.6-147-fc13) on an In-
tel Core 2 Duo E8400 3.0GHz with 4GB memory it took about 8 seconds for MCMAS to
verify 44 properties including the specifications discussed above. The memory consump-
tion was approximately 12MB. The code for the scenario as translated is included in the
MCMAS release [29].
In this example the basic properties expressed by formulas (1)-(3) in Section 5 were
shown to hold on the model for all agents in the system. Formula (4) does not hold for any.
As presented in Figure 8, Formula (5) holds for some agents (i.e., PSP , SP , and C) but
not for all of them. This means not only all parties can fulfil their contractual obligations
successfully, but also that all the violations shown in Figure 8 are potentially realised in
the model. In some cases there is no recovery from a violation. The toolkit also returned
results for the properties discussed earlier in this section in line with our intuitions. Table 2
summarises some of the findings.
We do not compare experimental results with other verification approaches to BPEL,
such as those described in the next section. Firstly, we are not aware of other work supporting
temporal-epistemic properties in a contract-oriented setting. Secondly, as far as we know, no
other similar compiler has been released as open-source, thereby making any comparison
difficult even for the CTL fragment. Notwithstanding the above MCMAS uses the de-facto
leading BDD library so we would not expect significant improvements in the verification
time by using other BDD-based solutions.
Table 2 Verification of the properties.
Property Satisfaction Property Satisfaction
6 no 10 yes
7 yes 11 yes
8 yes 12 yes
9 no 13 yes
7 Related work and conclusions
Several deontic formalisms have been proposed in computer science over the past twenty
years; see, e.g., [30] for a first collection. A number of logics, including [31], have been put
forward to distinguish between ideal (correct, acceptable) and actual (possibly incorrect)
behaviour in the context of computing systems. The formalism used in this paper belongs to
this line of work. Specifically, the formal model used here, i.e., temporal deontic systems of
Section 2, is an extension to branching time of deontic interpreted systems [14,17], a for-
malism for reasoning about knowledge and correctness. The presentation given here follows
that of [32], where a bounded model checking technique was also given.
The notion of compliance has acquired considerable attention in the past few years in
the area of agents and generally in AI. For example, [33] presents nC+, an extension of C+,
the action language proposed by Giunchiglia et al., to deal with persistence [34], where ac-
ceptable and disallowed transitions are specified. Differently from the work reported here,
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the emphasis in [33] is on labelling transitions rather than states; there is also more atten-
tion on the modelling, whereas our concerns are primarily related to efficient verification.
More recently, [35] presented a formalism whereby a normative system is represented by a
subset of a transition system representing a system’s behaviours, also in terms of allowed
and disallowed transitions. However, differently from the present contribution, the authors
are concerned with the meta-logical properties of the logic and the theoretical complexity of
the resulting model checking problem. In constrast to these, here we take a relatively well-
understood formalism and pursue effective verification of contract-regulated web services.
The above are only two lines of the many directions of theoretical work currently being
investigated. Given the emphasis of the present work does not concern the underpinning
formal models, we refer the reader interested in the former to the proceedings of the many
workshops and thematic symposia regularly held on these topics. Instead, below we discuss
some of the more prominent contributions in verification of web services, focusing on those
that are more closely related to the approach taken here.
Solaiman et al. [36] discuss an approach based on specifying contracts as finite state
machines (FSM). The rights and obligations of the contractual parties are extracted from
the clauses of the contracts and mapped into the states, transitions, and output functions of a
FSM. The contracts are verified using the model checker SPIN [37]. Using this methodology
only LTL properties can be verified. While this work is relevant, it focuses on the contract
themselves, not on the agents’ behaviours in the presence of contracts that may be broken.
Foster et al. [25] discuss a model based approach to verifying web service composition
based on workflows. The technique is based on establishing trace equivalence between the
design and implementation. The workflow specifications are modelled as message sequence
charts in UML and then abstracted into the FSP process algebra, while the implementa-
tion is mechanically translated to FSP. The LTSA tool is used for analysing the resulting
implementation.
Pistore et al. [5] present a technique based on the known approach to planning via
model checking. Specifically the paper focuses on a general framework for planning un-
der uncertainty applied to the automated composition and monitoring of BPEL processes.
The approach has been devised to deal with non-deterministic domains, partial observabil-
ity and extended goals. Somewhat in the same spirit Lazovik et al. [38] present a planning
framework for services specified as BPEL processes based on the principle of interleaved
planning and execution. The execution of planned goals is monitored against predefined
standard business processes and interacts with the user to achieve satisfaction of the goal.
User requests are specified in XSRL, a high level representation format.
Hull et al. [39] discuss how Mealy signatures may facilitate the verification of service
properties of e-compositions specified in BPEL. Propositional Linear Temporal Logic is
used for specifying properties. Verification results were given in the context of bounded
queues, unbounded queues and “white box” mediators. However, while a bounded queue
composition can be simulated by a finite state automaton, it has been argued that Mealy ma-
chines composed using unbounded queues may lead to undecidability in the LTL verification
problem.
Walton [40] defines interactions between Web services in the form of a dialogue pro-
tocol. A dialogue protocol encompasses patterns of the message exchange and rules of the
dialogue. A Multi-Agent Protocol language was used for expressing the dialogue protocol
and the SPIN Model checker [37] was used to perform verification.
Fu et al. [24] suggested modelled services as peers interacting via asynchronous mes-
sages in XML format. The authors present a compiler translating the conversation protocol
to PROMELA and show that properties of conversation protocols, expressed in LTL, can be
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automatically verified using SPIN. Our translation into automata is based on the one pre-
sented originally in this paper. Other translations from BPEL rely on different semantics;
for example [28] uses the pi calculus while [27] is based on Petri nets.
Although not based on BPEL, Huang et al. [41] present an approach to verifying OWL-S
process models by using the test cases generated in the model checking process. The authors
extend the BLAST model checker [42] to handle concurrency constructs in OWL-S and
propose enhancements in OWL-S and PDDL to facilitate automated test case generation.
Baresi et al. [26] explored the use of the Bogor model checker [43] to verify BPEL
workflows. At design time a composition of BPEL processes is modelled using the ALBERT
assertion language, which is then translated into Bogor’s input language for model checking.
At run time the assertions defined in ALBERT are checked to monitor the required proper-
ties. Mongiell et al. [44] propose a formal model to verify executions of BPEL processes.
Related to some of the work we presented here, they also report on a compiler from BPEL
into the input language of the NuSMV model checker [45] in order to check CTL proper-
ties on the models for BPEL compositions. Similarly, Kazhamiakin et al. [46] also adopted
NuSMV and SPIN to verify web service compositions, but they focused on the communica-
tion models in the composition, especially asynchronous and buffered communications. To
do so, they developed a parametric model to describe a hierarchy of communications and
presented an algorithm to build the most adequate model to capture behaviours related to
communication.
Several tools other than model checkers have been employed for the verification of web
service compositions. For example, Rouached et al. [47] use event calculus [48] together
with one of the available engines to model and verify BPEL processes. In addition to the
properties specified in the event calculus, the architecture proposed can also check non-
functional constraints on the behaviours of individual service providers. Schlingloff et al.
[49] model BPEL processes in Petri nets to perform usability analysis and check ATL [50]
properties. Related to this, more recently Ouyang et al. [51] give a very detailed translation
of BPEL into Petri nets, but their approach focus on reachability analysis, check conflicting
message-consuming activities, and verify garbage collection on queued messages.
Within the domain of MAS [52] addresses the problem of reasoning about the correct-
ness of business contracts using commitments. The constraints considered as part of the
contract specifications do not include temporal nor epistemic modalities. Baldoni et al. [53]
propose a method to verify the conformance of agent behaviours with respect to a public
protocol. Their focus is on the interoperability among agents not on the obligations and vio-
lations as we addressed here. Similarly to [52] they also do not consider CTL and epistemic
properties.
The above is only a quick summary of some of the many valuable contributions in the
rich literature on verification of web service compositions. However, none of the works in
the literature address the issue of violation, non-compliance, and recovery of contract-based
behaviours in a web service setting. Still, notions such as SLAs, protocols, and contracts
appear central in the context of multi-agent systems, where entities are autonomously max-
imising their own objectives possibly leading to non-compliant behaviour. Similarly, while
the MAS community has made inroads into verifying multi-agent systems by means of rich
intensional logics such as epistemic, deontic and ATL logics, these have typically not been
considered yet in the web service literature.
In summary, our contribution focuses on a novel technique for the verification of contract-
regulated service compositions. In our approach services and contracts are specified as
BPEL behaviours. These descriptions are semi-automatically compiled into ISPL, and then
verified using the symbolic model checker MCMAS. We find the approach has three salient
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features distinguishing it from the literature. First, we support a rich and expressive range
of specifications coming directly from multi-agent systems theories; we find these partic-
ularly appropriate in the context of sophisticate web service interactions. Second, we can
reason both in terms of contract-compliant and violations, as well as more sophisticated
concepts including various notions of recovery. Third, the approach is essentially automatic
and paired with a state-of-the-art model checker for multi-agent systems, thereby enabling
the possibility of verifying very large state spaces such as those arising from real scenarios.
As part of future work, we highlight some of the objectives which we hope to achieve
and incorporate in the framework presented:
– As stated in the earlier parts of the paper the formalism of deontic interpreted systems
in its coarse red/green partitioning of local states cannot support reasoning about mul-
tiple local violations as required, for example, in contrary-to-duty situations or multiple
contract clauses. Extensions of this work could include further labelling to account for
these needs.
– Since MCMAS does not support real-time systems, some BPEL constructs such as dead-
line and timeout are currently translated into non-deterministic behaviours. For real-time
properties, a secondary model checker, such as UPPAAL [54] or Verics[55], can be inte-
grated into the framework.
– Currently the transformation of contracts from an informal representation to BPEL is
a manual process. Recently several frameworks with dedicated contracting languages,
e.g., [21], have been proposed in order to compile electronic contracts from their in-
formal representations. No language proposed so far seamlessly integrates behaviour
descriptions with contracts, however this would be something worth studying further.
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